Here is how the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis rather typically describes the 1907 Panic on their website:
The Panic of 1907 was a financial crisis set off by a series of bad banking decisions and a frenzy of withdrawals caused by public distrust of the banking system. J.P. Morgan and other wealthy Wall Street bankers lent their own funds to save the country from a severe financial crisis.1
Fohlin, Gehrig and Haas, in their scholarly 2015 paper Rumors and Runs in Opaque Markets: Evidence from the Panic of 1907, more insightfully conclude that “this panic was purely rumor-based.”2
The run on the Trust Company of America is a perfect example. (The term “run” may be unfamiliar to some younger readers. Banks loan out money they have on deposit—this is their main means of profit. However, if a bank loaned out too much, and many depositors panicked and simultaneously demanded their money, the bank could collapse. A run is depicted in the famous film It’s a Wonderful Life. Runs have been more rarely seen in recent years due to the advent of FDIC insurance.)
Quoting Alvan S. Brown in his 1913 book The Financial Conspiracy of 1907:
[On] October 22nd, after banking hours, Mr. George W. Perkins and Mr. Henry P. Davison, both of the firm of J. P. Morgan & Co., called on Mr. Oakleigh Thorne at the offices of the Trust Company of America. They thoroughly examined the financial condition of the institution.
It showed, to be brief, that it had $74,000,000 in assets, of which $12,000,000 was in cash. Mr. Perkins and Mr. Davison said to Mr. Thorne: “They were pleased to find the conditions as good as they were.”
That same night, October 22nd, a secret meeting was held at the Manhattan Hotel. Ostensibly to save the Trust Company of America. Present on this event were Mr. George W. Perkins, Mr. Henry P. Davison, Mr. J. P. Morgan, Mr. George B. Cortelyou, then Secretary of the U. S. Treasury and a member of the cabinet of President Theodore Roosevelt, and others. But Mr. Thorne, President of the Trust Company of America, was conspicuous by his absence. He, the most interested of all, was not invited.3
Let’s continue the story by quoting the eminent finance journalist Ferdinand Lundberg in his 1937 book America’s 60 Families:
A story appeared in the New York Evening Sun, according to the Stanley Congressional Committee in 1911, to the effect that there was a run on the Trust Company of America. It was a fabricated yarn, but the morning Sun had carried a suggestive story that Oakleigh Thorne, president of the Trust Company of America, might resign. . . .
There was logic behind this, for the Sun at the time was published by William Laffan, who was personally subsidized by J. P. Morgan. . . .
The morning after the Evening Sun sounded the false alarm, October 24, 1907, a front-page story appeared in the New York Times, published by Adolph Ochs, relating that there had been a terrific run on the Trust Company of America and that worried bankers had met in an all-night conference. The information was false; there had been no run. As brought out before the Stanley Committee, this article was planted in the unsuspecting Times by none other than George W. Perkins [partner in J. P. Morgan and Company] . . . stipulating to the Times representative, like his editors impressed by the Morgan power, that neither the name of Perkins nor J. P Morgan and Company be mentioned. . . .
The day the Times blazoned forth the fictitious story, frenzied depositors withdrew $13,500,000 from the Trust Company of America.4
Thus a perfectly solvent and successful bank came nearly to ruin by a rumor manufactured out of thin air. As we’ll soon see, Oakleigh Thorne and the Trust Company of America were brought to their knees and placed at the mercy of J. P. Morgan himself.
But let’s step back and look at the two chief U.S. architects of the 1907 Panic—Morgan and John D. Rockefeller. As Lundberg noted:
If there was a conspiracy, and the preponderance of evidence that there unquestionably was, it was a joint venture of the Morgan and Rockefeller groups to apportion certain economic domains. The Morgan and Rockefeller groups in this period were intertwined in a number of ventures, and busily traded and bartered positions, one with the other.5
Ruthless monopolists, J. P. Morgan and John D. Rockefeller were generally regarded as the two most powerful bankers in America. Both had personal financial incentives for the Panic, as well as an overarching objective that has impacted America’s economy to this day.
Let’s look first at Rockefeller, who was deeply connected to the actual trigger point of the Panic. John D., as many know, not only headed Standard Oil, but the Rockefellers had their hands in many other interests. This included copper.
In 1899, William Rockefeller (John D.’s brother) and Henry Rogers, a vice president of Standard Oil, took control of the Anaconda Copper Company (renaming it Amalgamated Copper) through devious methods described by Joshua M. Brown in “Anaconda Copper: The Greatest Deal in Wall Street History?”:
Rogers and Rockefeller gave a check for $39 million to Marcus Daly for the Anaconda properties, on the condition that he would deposit it in the [Rockefellers’] National City Bank and leave it untouched for an unspecified period. They then set up a paper organization known as the Amalgamated Copper Company, with their own clerks as dummy directors, and caused Amalgamated to buy Anaconda—not for cash but for $75 million in Amalgamated stock which was conveniently printed for the purpose. From the National City Bank, Rogers and Rockefeller now borrowed $39 million to cover the check they had given to Marcus Daly, and as collateral for this loan, they used the $75 million in Amalgamated stock. They now sold the Amalgamated stock on the market (first having touted it through their brokers) for $75 million. With the proceeds, they retired the $39 million loan from the National City Bank, and pocketed $36 million as their own profit on the deal.6
Having thus established Amalgamated Copper, the Rockefellers intended to completely take over the copper industry. Amalgamated succeeded in acquiring control of several other copper companies. However, one man in particular stood in their way.
Young Augustus Heinze, an engineer by training, and backed by a $50,000 inheritance from his father, “developed a smelting process that enabled him to produce copper from very low-grade ore in native rock more than 1,500 feet below ground.”7
Heinze soon established a highly successful company, United Copper. He was beloved by the miners who worked for him; he reduced their working hours from 10 hours per day to eight. Quite a contrast to the Rockefellers, whose tactics against striking miners resulted in the Ludlow Massacre, in which 21 people, including miners’ wives and children, were killed. As Wikipedia notes, John D. Rockefeller “was widely blamed for having orchestrated the massacre.”8
Standard Oil and Amalgamated Copper both offered to buy out United Copper, but Heinze was determined to remain independent. Quoting Lundberg:
Amalgamated Copper was a high-cost producer. United Copper was a low-cost producer which could, and did, freely undersell Amalgamated in all markets. Between 1901 and 1904 Amalgamated Copper common, of a par value of $150,000,00, declined sharply. . . . Barron [Clarence W. Barron, who founded the journal that became Barron’s, and served as the president of Dow Jones] revealed that Amalgamated Copper “people” had told him with respect to Heinze, “We are going to settle it on our own way.” 9
Heinze and United Copper were now on the Rockefeller “hit list.”
Smithsonian notes that “despite his charm and gentlemanly demeanor, Heinze carried a reputation as a man not to be trifled with. When some thugs from Utah arrived in Butte and tried to assault Heinze and a friend on their way home from a club, the Copper King and his friend fought their attackers off, ‘pounding their heads in the gutter, and a few minutes later the thugs were handed over to the police,’ one miner told the Boston Globe.”10
In 1907, Heinze moved from Montana to New York City. His successful mining operations had made him a multimillionaire, and he believed that if he established himself in banking and finance, he could hold the Morgans and Rockefellers in check. He became president of the Mercantile Investment Bank. His brothers, Otto and Arthur, set up their own brokerage firm at 42 Broadway. Needing allies, Heinze partnered up with tycoon Charles W. Morse, an adversary of J. P. Morgan. Morse, known as the “Ice King,” owned a monopoly on New York City’s ice business as well as the steamship industry. Heinze and Morse sat on the boards of several banks, but the partnership would prove to be a mistake, owing to Morse’s personal corruption.
It’s time for an important aside. Most investors buy stocks hoping their value will rise. However, some investors sell “short.” They sell stock they don’t actually own, with a pledge to buy it later. This is done when the investor believes a stock’s value will go down. If the investor sells a stock short at $10 per share, and its value later falls to $5, he can redeem his pledge to buy at the lower price of $5, thus making a profit.
One investor shorting a stock will have little impact on the stock’s value. However, when the likes of a Morgan and Rockefeller are involved, they can massively short-sell a stock, making its market price plummet, say from $100 to $50 per share. This causes the stock’s real investors to panic, thinking something must have gone wrong with the company the stock represents. Panicked investors then begin selling their shares, hoping to get out “before it’s too late.” The panic drives the stock much lower, say to $20. The rich short-sellers can now move in and cover their bet, buying for $20 per share the stock they sold at $100.
The example above is a microcosm of the 1929 stock market crash, in which short-selling was one of the mechanisms by which the Deep State was able to generate a snowballing panic among investors, then moved back into the market and bought up the stocks of whole corporations at pennies on the dollar. William J. Gill highlights an example from 1929:
Albert H. Wiggin, chairman of the Chase National Bank, was unmasked as one of the premier villains when it was discovered he had sold short some 42,500 shares of Chase stock beginning a full month before Black Thursday, thus making a personal contribution to the crash. Using a “front” company, he had financed the deal with a $6.5 million loan from his own bank. Wiggin picked up more than $4 million in profits on this one transaction at a time when investors not plugged into Chase’s inside information were losing their shirts. Yet Wiggin was kept on as Chase chairman for an additional three years and the bank’s board, in gratitude for the splendid example he had set, voted him a lifetime salary of $100,000 per year upon his retirement.11
The Fate of Heinze
But back to Augustus Heinze and the Rockefellers.
The Heinze brothers discovered that the stock of United Copper was being heavily shorted by about twenty brokers, artificially depressing the price. Short interest was at 105 percent, meaning more stock was being shorted than traded for expected gain.12 The brothers therefore developed a plan to counter-attack.
Believing they already owned most of United Copper’s stock, they would attempt buy up the outstanding shares. This, they believed, would drive the price so high that the short-sellers would find themselves in a “short squeeze.” In a short squeeze, a stock’s price rises dramatically, making short sellers panic and cover their short sales by buying the stock at high prices, driving the stock even higher.
Quoting Mary T. Rodgers and James E. Payne in Monetary Policy and the Copper Price Bust: A Reassessment of the Cause of the Panic of 1907:
Early on Tuesday, October 15, 1907, it looked as though the plan would work. United Copper had rallied from $40 to $60 during the day. But by the end of the trading day, the price closed at $36 because an agent had entered the market with a large block to sell. Charles Morse [Heinze’s corrupt partner] has been identified as the block seller in an analysis of Morse’s archives. Morse’s betrayal of the Heinzes was also rumored in the press that week. By supplying his shares to buyers earlier than planned, he served his own interests first, meeting his margin calls at the expense of the Heinzes meeting theirs.13
The Heinze brothers had thrown all they had, plus borrowed money, into their attempt to corner shares of United Copper, but it failed to create the hoped-for short squeeze.
The Chicago Tribune reported that “foes of Heinze” had received a tip well in advance of the attempted short squeeze.14 The Wall Street sharks were ready, covering their shorts with shares sold by Morse and other sellers.
United Copper’s stock was then ravaged, falling to $10 per share in just two days. Heinze, having already expended $50 million, was powerless to stop it. United Copper was ruined. The Heinze brothers’ brokerage firm went broke and suspended operations. The State Savings Bank of Butte, Montana, which had used United Copper stock as collateral on its loans, collapsed. Heinze was forced to resign as president of the Mercantile Investment Bank, and—fueled by unfounded newspaper rumors—other banks that he and Morse were affiliated with began to experience depositor runs. As Robert F. Bruner and Sean D. Carr report in The Panic of 1907: “Historian Robert Sobel . . . noted that some newspapers published articles ‘containing hints of wrongdoing’ that had been planted by Heinze’s enemies at Standard Oil and that Rockefeller-affiliated banks called in loans to Heinze and insisted on the sale of United Copper to meet the obligations.”15
The Rockefeller interests thus succeeded in gaining their coveted monopoly on copper, and Augustus Heinze died in poverty at the age of 44. Now it was time for J. P. Morgan to make his play.
Morgan Moves In
If the Rockefellers had a personal financial incentive in the 1907 Panic—cornering the copper market—J. P. Morgan had one as well. As Lundberg notes:
It was later freely charged, and President [Theodore] Roosevelt himself hinted at, that the panic was aggravated if not started, solely to permit the United States Steel Corporation [controlled by Morgan] to gobble up the Tennessee Coal and Iron Corporation in contravention of the Sherman [antitrust] Act. Tennessee Coal was not then very important, but it was known to possess ore deposits among the richest in the world . . . . All the facts in the case point unmistakably to the conclusion that the doom of Heinze and United Copper was a quid pro quo exacted by the Rockefellers for permitting Morgan to swallow Tennessee Coal and Iron.16
At the time of United Copper’s crash, and runs on associated banks—as well as runs on other banks by rumor-spurred nervous depositors—J. P. Morgan was in Richmond, Virginia. Having received the reports of financial distress, he returned to New York City, and was observed to be “singing lustily” on the train ride home.17
Morgan aligned with other bankers to “halt the crisis” by bailing out troubled banks. He was lionized in the newspapers of the day as a hero who stopped the 1907 Panic with “his” money. And while he did use his money, as Lundberg points out, “President Roosevelt placed $25,000,000 of Treasury Funds in the hands of J. P. Morgan and Company, giving Morgan tight control of the money market.”18 He also notes that the conduit, Treasury Secretary George Cortelyou, “in 1909 was to enter upon a twenty-five-year tenure as head of the Morgan-Rockefeller Gas Company of New York.”19
As Alvan Brown asked, “Why did the U. S. Treasury, with the knowledge and consent of President Theodore Roosevelt, turn over $25,000,000, in cash, to Mr. J. P. Morgan? Why was not that $25,000,000 advanced to the suffering banks?”20
Morgan was selective about who he helped. Historian Frederick Lewis Allen wrote in Life magazine that “certain chroniclers have arrived at the ingenious conclusion that the Morgan interests took advantage of the unsettled conditions during the autumn of 1907 to precipitate the Panic, guiding it shrewdly as it progressed, so that it would kill off rival banks, and consolidate the pre-eminence of the banks within the Morgan orbit.”21
“On Friday, October 18, news broke that the president of Knickerbocker Trust, Charles T. Barney, was an associate of Morse [Heinze’s partner].”22
The scary headlines caused a run on Knickerbocker, which paid out $8 million to depositors in just three hours. The final blow came when James Stillman, president of the Rockefellers’ National City Bank, and father-in-law to William Rockefeller’s two sons, cashed a check for $1.5 million—in the neighborhood of $40 million in today’s dollars. Knickerbocker was then forced to close its doors.
Charles T. Barney, president of Knickerbocker, appealed to J. P. Morgan—an old friend—for help. Morgan refused to meet with him. Barney took a gun and committed suicide. The note he left said: “I do not kill myself because I am a poor man, but because I have lost faith in mankind.”23
Readers will recall the account at this post’s beginning, of how the Morgan interests planted completely fake stories in newspapers about the Trust Company of America and its president Oakleigh Thorne, leading to a massive run on that bank.
The Trust Company of America was now on the brink of ruin, but J. P. Morgan did not let it die as he did Knickerbocker—the Trust had something Morgan wanted. Quoting Lundberg:
Thorne soon learned what the bankers’ game was. Among the securities possessed by his bank was a big block of Tennessee Oil and Coal stock, held against a small loan of $482,700 to a Rockefeller group . . . . J. P. Morgan stipulated that aid to the beleaguered bank was contingent upon the release of this stock in exchange for bonds of the United States Steel Corporation. Indeed, all banks holding loans on Tennessee stock were ordered by J. P. Morgan to give up this stock.24
As Richard A. Naclerio notes in “The Panic of 1907: How J. P. Morgan Took Over Wall Street”:
The only problem for Morgan was that this was not exactly legal. This transaction came dangerously close to violating the Sherman Anti-Trust Law. E.H. Gary, H.C. Frick, and J.P. Morgan visited President Theodore Roosevelt to talk him into overlooking the monopolistic implications of the takeover. . . . President Roosevelt blessed the deal, and Morgan owned another one of his competitors (with estimated mineral reserves of 700,000,000 tons of iron ore and 2,000,000,000 tons of coal), while expanding the reach of US Steel and usurping valuable southern real estate at the same time.25
And for Morgan, there was another dimension of profit in the 1907 Panic. Newspapers back then—and to this very day—have hailed J. P Morgan as having “saved the U.S. banks.” And it is true that Morgan used his own money—along with the $25 million in U.S. Treasury funds, and contributions from other bankers (even John D. Rockefeller chipped in $10 million). However, many of these accounts leave the reader with the impression that Morgan somehow “gifted” his money to the banks; what so often goes unsaid is that these bailouts were not donations but loans at exorbitant interest.
Continuing to quote Neclario:
At the height of the Panic, J.P. Morgan stepped in to aid the banking community and quell the massive drop in bank reserves and market collapse. He was touted by many Americans as a true patriot and selfless beacon of financial hope for the country. But, to those who rigidly examined his actions, he was a monster who fed off the demise of economic destruction. . . .
On October 23rd a run began on the Lincoln Trust Company dropping their deposits from $21,000,000 to $6,000,000.
On October 24th, J.P. Morgan invited fourteen banks to loan $23,550,000 at interest rates varying from 10% to a gargantuan 60% and renewed the next morning at 20%.
On October 25th $1,000,000 was jointly loaned to the Lincoln Trust Co. by the First National Bank of New York, [the Rockefellers’ ] National City Bank of New York, and J.P. Morgan & Co., and the same was done for the Trust Company of America, including another $9,700,000 at 25% to 50% interest. . . .
A total of $6,000,000 representing nineteen banks was loaned directly to Lincoln Trust and the Trust Co. of America. After that, another $10,000,000 was raised for more bailouts. . . .
J.P. Morgan swooped in and absorbed the Mercantile Trust, and six more trust companies and banks, including the two largest banks that were hit the hardest: The Trust Company of America and Lincoln Trust. Morgan’s Guarantee Trust and Manhattan Trust companies would control them with the Rothschild family US emissary, August Belmont [Jr.], at the helm of the merger. . . .
While J.P. Morgan was ordering the public to “keep cool heads” and he and his Wall Street cohort were charging massive interest rates on their bailout loans, it was payback time. Morgan called the collateral on the loans he gave to his old adversary, C.W. Morse. He used the collateralized bonds to acquire Morse’s Consolidated Steamship Company, which was his competitor in that sector as well, as Morgan owned the International Mercantile Marine Company—the parent company of the famous Titanic White Star Lines. . . .
This consolidation was so egregious that it was deemed a “Money Trust” by regulatory politicians. The questionable circumstances and outcomes of the Panic, and J.P. Morgan’s massive takeovers led to Louisiana Congressman Arsene Pujo’s Money Trust investigations and subsequent Sub-Committee on Banking and Currency Report in January of 1913. Through the “Money Trust Hearings” the Pujo Committee findings were astounding. They unanimously determined that a small cartel of financiers, namely J.P. Morgan and a few other of New York’s most powerful bankers, had gained consolidated control of numerous industries and monopolized them through the abuse of the public trust, mostly during and after the Panic of 1907. . . .
The committee’s scathing report on the banking trade concluded that 341 officers of J.P. Morgan & Co. also sat on the boards of directors of 112 corporations with a market capitalization of $22.5 billion (the total capitalization of the New York Stock Exchange was then estimated at $26.5 billion). In other words, Morgan had influence or outright control over so many corporations’ boards of directors that they represented over four-fifths of the value of every corporation on the entire New York Stock Exchange. Despite the sweeping investigation and the damning evidence the Pujo Committee compiled, there is no evidence that any of the men named in the Pujo Report were ever arrested, prosecuted, or fined for any crime, and yet no group or investigative committee had ever proven the Pujo Committee inaccurate.26
The Devil Takes the Long View
In addition to the immediate profits the Morgans and Rockefellers enjoyed from the Panic of 1907, there was an even larger far-reaching objective. As Allen noted: “The lesson of the Panic of 1907 was clear, though not for some years was it to be embodied in legislation: the United States gravely needed a central banking system.”27
In 1908, Congress formed the National Monetary Commission to study U.S. banking laws and recommend “reforms.” The commission was chaired by Senator Nelson Aldrich, who was not only a Freemason and treasurer of the Grand Lodge of Rhode Island,28 he was so close to John D. Rockefeller that his daughter Abigail married John D. Rockefeller, Jr., and his son William became president of the Rockefeller’s Chase National Bank. He was the maternal grandfather of Nelson Aldrich Rockefeller, who became Vice President under Gerald Ford, and David Rockefeller, who was chairman of the Council on Foreign Relations from 1970 to 1987, and was still honorary chairman upon his death at 101 in 2017.
The legislation Aldrich introduced in the Senate, which would become the basis of the modern Federal Reserve, was crafted by several of America’s richest bankers, at a secret nine-day meeting in 1910, at a private club on Jekyll Island off the Georgia coast. At that time, Jekyll Island was an exclusive retreat of the wealthy elite—the Rockefellers, Morgans, Vanderbilts and Astors.
The Federal Reserve’s origination at the Jekyll Island meeting is well-established. Today Jekyll Island is open to the public. You can visit the Jekyll Island Club Hotel, and sit in its “Federal Reserve Room” where the Fed was birthed. The first reporter to break the Jekyll Island story was B. C. Forbes, founder of Forbes magazine.
Attending this meeting were agents from the world’s three greatest banking houses: those of J. P. Morgan, John D. Rockefeller, and the Rothschilds. Together, they represented an estimated 25 percent of the world’s entire wealth. Acting for the Morgan interests were: Benjamin Strong, head of J. P. Morgan’s Bankers Trust Company; Henry Davison, senior partner in J. P. Morgan & Co.; and Charles Norton, head of Morgan’s First National Bank of New York. Representing the Rockefellers were Senator Aldrich and Frank Vanderlip, president of National City Bank. Vanderlip gained that lofty position after, as Assistant Secretary of the U.S Treasury, he oversaw the sale of $200 million in government bonds which financed the Spanish-American War. That war had put Cuba’s sugar industry, the richest in the world, directly into the hands of National City Bank. (For more details on this, see my 2012 article for The New American, or a slightly revised edition, with pictures, which is the first chapter in my book Thirteen Pieces of the Jigsaw.)
In a memoir he published in 1935, Vanderlip related:
There was an occasion near the close of 1910 when I was as secretive, indeed as furtive, as any conspirator . . . . I do not feel it is any exaggeration to speak of our secret expedition to Jekyll Island as the occasion of the actual conception of the Federal Reserve System. . . . We were told to leave our last names behind us. We were told further that we should avoid dining together on the night of our departure. We were instructed to come one at a time and as unobtrusively as possible to the terminal of the New Jersey littoral of the Hudson, where Senator Aldrich’s private car would be in readiness, attached to the rear end of the train for the South. Once aboard the private car, we began to observe the taboo that had been fixed on last names. . . . Discovery, we knew, simply must not happen. If it were to be discovered that our particular group had got together and written a banking bill, that bill would have no chance whatever of passage by Congress.29
The most important figure at Jekyll Island, who actually ran the meeting, was the Rothschilds’ agent, Paul Warburg. Their plans materialized in the Federal Reserve, which ultimately resulted from the legislation, penned on Jekyll Island, that Senator Aldrich introduced. Because of the senator’s well-known ties to Wall Street, Congress rejected the Aldrich Bill. But the bankers gained passage of a very similar act, the Glass-Owen Bill, which created the Fed officially. It was passed on December 23, 1913—when Congress was eager to adjourn for Christmas.
Subsequently President Woodrow Wilson named Paul Warburg as the first vice chairman of the Federal Reserve Board (a position from which national interest rates would be set). And he appointed Benjamin Strong to run the New York Fed, the system’s nucleus. The very men who had secretly planned the bank now controlled it.
Since the Fed’s creation, America has been embroiled in wars (World War I began six months after the Fed’s birth), skyrocketing debt, income tax to pay the debt (the Income Tax Amendment was also introduced by Senator Aldrich), and skyrocketing inflation caused by the Fed’s creation of fiat money out of nothing. The best book that explains all this, of course, is G. Edward Griffin’s The Creature from Jekyll Island.
That was our ultimate inheritance from the Panic of 1907. Today, the principal names may have changed from Morgan and Rockefeller to Blackrock and Vanguard, but some of the devices used by the bankers during that original turmoil may visit us again, including short-selling, cornering markets, and generating panics through fake news, in order to help bring about Klaus Schwab’s “Great Reset.”
- “The Panic of 1907: J. P. Morgan and the Money Trust,” Federal Reserve of Bank of St. Louis, https://www.stlouisfed.org/en/education/the-panic-of-1907-jp-morgan-and-the-money-trust.
- Caroline Fohlin, Thomas Gehrig, Marlene Haas, Rumors and Runs in Opaque Markets: Evidence from the Panic of 1907, April 29, 2015, 5. https://www.oefg.at/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/Haas_et_al_-_Rumors_and_Runs_in_Opaque_Markets_Evidence_from_the_Panic_of_1907.pdf.
- Alvan S. Brown, The Financial Conspiracy of 1907: Brief Review of the Panic, 1913, 11, https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/public/gdcmassbookdig/financialconspir00brow/financialconspir00brow.pdf.
- Ferdinand Lundberg, America’s 60 Families (New York: Citadel Press, 1937), 91-92.
- Lundberg, 90-91.
- Joshua M. Brown “Anaconda Copper: The Greatest Deal in Wall Street History?” The Reformed Broker, September 24, 2012, https://thereformedbroker.com/2012/09/24/anaconda-copper-the-greatest-deal-in-wall-street-history/.
- Gilbert King, “The Copper King’s Precipitous Fall,” Smithsonian, September 20, 2012, https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/the-copper-kings-precipitous-fall-44306513/.
- “Ludlow Massacre,” Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ludlow_Massacre.
- Lundberg, 91-92.
- William J. Gill, Trade Wars Against America: A History of United States Trade and Monetary Policy (New York: Praeger, 1990), 96.
- Matt Rickard, “Panic of 1907/1922,” Matt Rickard, June 23, 2022, https://matt-rickard.com/panic-of-1907.
- Mary T. Rodgers and James E. Payne, Monetary Policy and the Copper Price Bust: A Reassessment of the Cause of the Panic of 1907, November 2017, https://www.readcube.com/articles/10.2139%2Fssrn.3069033.
- Robert F. Bruner and Sean D. Carr, The Panic of 1907: Heralding a New Era of Finance, Capitalism, and Democracy, Second Edition (Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, 2023), 80.
- Lundberg, 90-91.
- Lundberg, 90-91.
- Lundberg, 92.
- Lundberg, 92.
- Alvan Brown, 14.
- Frederick Lewis Allen, “Morgan the Great,” Life, April 25, 1949, 126.
- Jon R. Moen and Ellis W. Tallman, “The Panic of 1907,” Federal Reserve History, December 4, 2015, https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/panic-of-1907.
- Alvan Brown, 13.
- Lundberg, 93-94.
- Richard A. Naclerio “The Panic of 1907: How J. P. Morgan Took Over Wall Street,” The Gotham Center for New York City, April 20, 2021, https://www.gothamcenter.org/blog/the-panic-of-1907-how-jp-morgan-took-over-wall-street.
- Allen, 141.
- “Nelson W. Aldrich,” Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nelson_W._Aldrich.
- Frank Vanderlip, “Farmboy to Financier,” Saturday Evening Post, February 9, 1935, 25, 70.